| Deals
and Ideals: Introduction, continued |
| Chapter
1 |
Two
Concepts of Nature, and Two Concepts of Reason
The Sophists, Plato and Natural Law, Continued |
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There are different
Sophistic perspectives on the convention of justice, each
seeing the will to pleasure and power, disguised as the reason
for morality, as coming from a different social source. For
the upper-class Callicles, who stands to gain by the rule
of force, morality is a slave revolt. Glaucon expresses the
view of the average middle-class person, who is more likely
to see reason as serving the individual as an instrument to
secure what s/he can get out of a dangerous situation; suggesting
the calculating convention of morality as a nonaggression
pact. As Glaucon describes it such a Hobbesian contract is
an insurance policy; it is rational to pay the premium, but
only if it cannot be avoided. Thrasymachus, however, albeit
unconsciously, represents an underdog view of the same scenario.
He maintains that conventional justice is always, in fact,
whatever the strong impose to their own advantage, so that
the just person always loses by obeying their rules. His position
is in a way the antithesis of Callicles's. Callicles sees
conventional justice, the social contract, as the conspiracy
of the weak. Thrasymachus sees it as the advantage of the
strong. That is a reading of the basic factual situation which
Thrasymachus shares with the Cynics and the early Stoics.
Unwittingly, in his justified realism about the facts or the
existence (which he, however, wrongly identifies with the
nature or essence) of social life, he takes up the theme of
the oppressed, the anarchist protest against institutional
justice as disguised power, against justificatory reason as
disguised will. This is a partial insight which later served
natural law theorists in their critique of unjust law as an
act of violence; which served the bourgeoisie in its ideology
critique of the Ancien régime; which served Marx's ideology
critique of capitalism; and which is now being rediscovered
by postmodernists such as Foucault and Derrida, in the critique
of "actually existing" Marxism. Thrasymachus has a very important
half truth, one which must be maintained against any attempt
(including the misuse of dialectics) to justify unjust rule
by identifying it with the ideal function of ruling which
Socrates speaks of. That, I think, is why Plato in The Republic
shows Thrasymachus remaining throughout the entire later discussion.
Socrates sees him as a comic and rather pathetic figure; while
calling him, tongue in cheek, "my most noble Thrasymachus",
he compares him to a slave boy in the baths, sluicing down
the customers. But Thrasymachus is a fool to be suffered gladly;
unlike Callicles, he is not malevolent.
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| The
Socratic arguments against Sophism were developed in a natural
law tradition for which the Sophistic answer is completely mistaken,
since the convention it is justifying - or rather (and significantly)
causally explaining - is not morality at all but expediency,
suggesting some rules which happen also to be found in genuine
morality. For the question "Why should I be moral?" can also
be meant as "Show me (not me as a particular self-interested
pleasure-seeker using my mind only to serve my interests, but
me as a participant in universal reason) that any rational mind
would see that I ought to be moral (not for a return in terms
of pleasure, money or power, and indeed even if the consequence
is a loss of those)". The reasoning being sought would be binding,
in a way akin to that of logic or mathematics; just as "2 plus
2 = 5" is wrong, untrue, and I ought not - indeed cannot as
a rational person - think it, so killing the innocent is wrong,
bad, against right reason; I ought not to - I may not in reason
- do it. |
| The
Platonic answer to the question asked that way is that we should
be governed by our understanding, reason (mind, intelligence,
Nous), which it sees as having access to the universal, both
in terms of essences (universals) and in terms of unity and
totality. It therefore sees reason as guiding us towards our
happiness, our fulfilment; that is, not pleasure but the essential
natural good for us, which includes our seeking a universal
good, in which the happiness in community, due to and adequate
to our nature, is found. Socrates and his followers aspired
to a rational spiritual illumination through unifying dialectical
philosophy, the aim of which was to guide human beings to their
ideal communal fulfilment, in the love (the only subject on
which Socrates claimed expertise) which unconditionally wills
not a particular pleasure but the universal good for every human
being. |
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